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Freedom of Speech and Contempt by 
Scandalizing the Court in Singapore 
 
Jack Tsen-Ta Lee 
The offence of scandalizing the court, a form of contempt of court, is regarded as 
obsolete in the United Kingdom. However, it continues to be imposed in other 
Commonwealth nations and remains very much alive in Singapore, having been 
applied in a crop of cases between 2006 and 2009. This short commentary examines 
one of these cases, Attorney-General v Hertzberg and others [2009] 1 Singapore 
Law Reports 1103, which has generated worldwide interest as it arose out of articles 
published in the Wall Street Journal Asia. In Hertzberg, the High Court of Singapore 
held that utterances by an alleged contemnor are actionable if they merely have an 
inherent tendency to affect the administration of justice. Drawing comparisons from 
other common law jurisdictions, it is contended that this traditional conception of the 
offence held by the court is inconsistent with the constitutionally guaranteed right to 
freedom of speech and expression, properly understood. The offence should therefore 
be fine-tuned by applying a more stringent standard for liability. 
THE SPECIES OF the offence of contempt of court colourfully termed ‘scandalizing the 
court’, often regarded as having fallen into desuetude in the United Kingdom,1 has 
continued to be imposed in other parts of the Commonwealth. In particular, it 
remains very much alive in Singapore. It has been applied in a crop of cases over the 
past few years,2 one of the most recent being Attorney-General v Hertzberg and 
others,3 a decision of the High Court of Singapore. 
Hertzberg has generated a fair amount of interest around the world as it arose 
out of two articles and a letter published in the Wall Street Journal Asia (WSJA) in 
June and July 2008. The respondents in the case were Daniel Hertzberg, editor of 
                                                   
1  In Ahnee v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] 2 AC 294 at 305, Lord Steyn, delivering the 
judgment of the Privy Council on appeal from Mauritius, noted: “In England such proceedings are 
rare and none has been successfully brought for more than 60 years.” A person was last found 
guilty of the offence by an English court in R v Colsey, The Times (9 May 1931): Colin Munro, Case 
Comment, “More Heat than Light from Anwar” (2009) 13 Edin L Rev 104 at 107. In Colsey, the 
editor of a magazine was found guilty of scandalizing the court for publishing an article suggesting 
that a judge could hardly be “altogether unbiased” when dealing with legislation he had helped to 
steer through Parliament as a law officer in an earlier Labour government. C J Miller has 
remarked that the case “is, by general consent, singularly difficult to defend… It seems most 
unlikely that an English court would adopt a similar attitude to such an innocuous publication 
today.”: Miller, Contempt of Court (2nd ed) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) at 374. 
2  See Attorney-General v Chee Soon Juan [2006] 2 SLR 650, HC (Singapore), You Xin v Public 
Prosecutor [2007] 4 SLR 17, HC (Singapore), Lee Hsien Loong v Singapore Democratic Party 
[2009] 1 SLR 642, HC (Singapore), and Attorney-General v Tan Liang Joo John [2009] 2 SLR 
1132, HC (Singapore). The Singapore Law Reports (SLR) is Singapore’s official series of law 
reports. 
3  Attorney-General v Hertzberg [2009] 1 SLR 1103. 
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the WSJA; Christine Glancey, WSJA’s managing editor; and Dow Jones Publishing 
Company (Asia) Inc, the proprietor and the publisher of the WSJA. The present case 
only involved Dow Jones, as the parties had agreed to hold the matters in respect of 
the first and second respondents in abeyance pending the outcome of this case and 
any consequent appeal.4 After having been found guilty of scandalizing the court, 
Dow Jones elected not to appeal. The Attorney-General’s Chambers eventually 
brought further contempt proceedings only against Melanie Kirkpatrick, deputy 
editor of the WSJA’s editorial page, as it was her decisions that had led to the pieces 
being published. In March 2009, Kirkpatrick acknowledged responsibility for the 
publication of the pieces through her solicitors and was fined S$10,000.5 It does not 
appear that she appealed against the sentence. 
According to the Attorney-General, the articles and letter published in the 
WSJA, “individually and taken together, impugn the integrity, impartiality and 
independence of the Singapore Judiciary. It is implied that the Singapore courts do 
not dispense justice fairly in cases involving political opponents and detractors of 
Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew and other senior government figures, and the courts 
facilitate the suppression of political dissent or criticism in Singapore through the 
award of damages in defamation actions.”6 The third respondent denied that the 
items published constituted a contempt of court. 
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ‘INHERENT TENDENCY’ TEST 
It is well established that the offence of scandalizing the court serves to protect the 
administration of justice, and is not intended to protect the dignity of the courts or 
judges. 7  At common law, there are no legal limits to the quantum of fine or 
imprisonment that the court may impose,8 and it is open to the court to deal with the 
matter summarily.9
One of the main issues in Hertzberg was the appropriate test for determining 
if the offence had been made out. According to prior Singapore case law, the words 
complained of had to possess an “inherent tendency to interfere with the 
administration of justice”.10 Put another way, such words must convey to an average 
 
4  Id at 1109, [3]. 
5  Zakir Hussain, “Govt to Take WSJ Editor to Court for Contempt: A-G Taking Action for Articles 
that ‘Scandalise the Singapore Judiciary’”, The Straits Times (14 March 2009); Zakir Hussain, 
“WSJ Senior Editor Fined $10,000 for Contempt of Court: Editor Responsible for Three Articles 
in its Sister Paper”, The Straits Times (20 March 2009). 
6  Hertzberg, above, n 3 at 1113, [8]. 
7  Id at 1118, [20], referring to Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273 at 322, 
HL; Solicitor-General v Radio Avon Ltd [1978] 1 NZLR 225 at 229, CA (NZ); Attorney-General v 
British Broadcasting Corporation [1981] AC 303 at 344, HL; Pertamina Energy Trading Ltd v 
Karaha Bodas Co LLC [2007] 2 SLR 518 at [22], HC (Singapore) (citing Times Newspapers with 
approval); You Xin, above, n 2 at [14]. 
8  Radio Avon, above, n 7 at 229; Ahnee, above, n 1 at 307. In the Singapore context, the Rules of 
Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (Singapore), O 52 r 1(1), provides that “[t]he power of the 
[High] Court or the Court of Appeal to punish for contempt of Court may be exercised by an order 
of committal in Form 109”. That form states, in part: “And it appearing to the satisfaction of the 
Court that the said defendant has been guilty of contempt of Court in (state the contempt): … It is 
ordered that for his said contempt, the defendant do stand committed to prison to be there 
imprisoned for [blank] (or until further order) (and/or be fined $[blank]).” Neither the Rules nor 
any other pieces of legislation set limits for these sanctions: Hertzberg, id at 1136, [62]. 
9  You Xin, above, n 2 at 32–33, [34]–[35]. 
10  Attorney-General v Wain [1991] SLR 383 at 397, [50], HC (Singapore), cited in Chee Soon Juan, 
above, n 2 at 661, [30]–[31]; and Lee Hsien Loong, above, n 2 at 714, [174]. 
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reasonable reader allegations of bias, lack of impartiality, impropriety or any 
wrongdoing concerning a judge in the exercise of his judicial function.11
Counsel for the respondent submitted that the test of whether there existed a 
“real risk” of prejudicing the administration of justice ought to be adopted, since it 
was clearer and struck a more appropriate balance between protecting the institution 
of an independent judiciary and the right to freedom of expression.12 He noted that 
this test had been widely adopted in other common law jurisdictions.13 However, the 
Court declined to accept the submission. It justified the rejection of the ‘real risk’ test 
on the ground that “conditions unique to Singapore (i.e., our small geographical size 
and the fact that in Singapore, judges decide both questions of fact and law) 
necessitate that we deal more firmly with attacks on the integrity and impartiality of 
our courts”.14
In support of these justifications, the Court relied on its earlier decision 
Attorney-General v Chee Soon Juan.15 The judge in that case expressed the view that 
“the geographical size of Singapore renders its courts more susceptible to unjustified 
attacks”,16 relying on Ahnee v Director of Public Prosecutions.17 There, the Privy 
Council on appeal from Mauritius reasoned as follows: 
[I]t is permissible to take into account that on a small island such as Mauritius the 
administration of justice is more vulnerable than in the United Kingdom. The need 
for the offence of scandalising the court on a small island is greater: see Feldman, 
Civil Liberties & Human Rights in England and Wales (1993), pp. 746–747; Barendt, 
Freedom of Speech (1985), pp. 218–219.18
However, the thrust of the academic opinions referred to in Ahnee is that a 
lower threshold for determining whether a court has been scandalized may be 
appropriate in jurisdictions where the position of the judiciary is unstable and 
vulnerable to undue pressure from the executive or segments of the public. It can be 
questioned whether this is an accurate description of the situation in present-day 
Singapore. There is no history of civil unrest directed at the courts that threatens 
their operation. Singapore judges have themselves rejected accusations of being 
under executive influence.19 Singapore is generally regarded as having become a 
developed nation in the mid-1980s, 20  and has a literate and well-educated 
 
11  Hertzberg, above, n 3 at 1124–1125, [31]. 
12  Id at 1117, [17]. 
13  Times Newspapers, above, n 7 at 299, HL; Radio Avon, above, n 7 at 234; Ahnee, above, n 1 at 
306; Wong Yeung Ng v Secretary of State for Justice [1999] 2 HKC 24 at 59, CA (HK); S v 
Mamabolo 2001 (5) BCLR 449 at [45], Const Ct (S Africa). 
14  Hertzberg, above, n 3 at 1125, [33]. 
15  Chee Soon Juan, above, n 2. 
16  Id at 659, [25]. 
17  Above, n 1. 
18  Id at 305–306. 
19  For instance, in Goh Chok Tong v Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin [1998] 1 SLR 547 at 563, [31]–
[32], the High Court stated that Singapore had “an open system of justice” and that there were “no 
private directives to a judge from the executive or from anyone one else on how a case is to be 
conducted”; while the judge in Chee Soon Juan, above, n 2 at 665–666, [50], said that Ross 
Worthington’s article “Between Hermes and Themis: An Empirical Study of the Contemporary 
Judiciary in Singapore” (2001) 28 J of Law & Society 490, which cast aspersions on the 
independence of the judiciary, “expressed the views of an individual who had made erroneous 
assumptions based on his own beliefs and inaccurate and/or wrong information. I could not 
accept the speculative conclusions, which the author arrived at, as the truth.” 
20  According to Table 1 (“Human Development Index Trends”) of the United Nations Development 
Programme’s report Human Development Indices: A Statistical Update 2008 <http://hdr.undp. 
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population. 21  There is little reason to assume that members of the public are 
incapable of assessing for themselves any allegations made against the judiciary.22
It might also be argued that a finding that the courts of a small nation have 
been scandalized should be readily made because false claims about the judiciary can 
spread quickly throughout the community. It is submitted that the geographical size 
of a jurisdiction per se is irrelevant in the age of blogs, text messaging and Twitter. 
The second justification for preferring the ‘inherent tendency’ test relied on in 
Chee Soon Juan and Hertzberg is that the administration of justice in Singapore is 
“wholly in the hands of judges and other judicial officers”23 as they are deciders of 
both law and fact;24 jury trials were removed for all criminal proceedings except 
capital cases in 1960, and entirely abolished in 1970.25 This rationalization was first 
given in the 1991 decision Attorney-General v Wain, and explained thus: 
[B]ecause judges in Singapore are judges of facts, the contempt of scandalizing the 
court by imputing bias to a judge, or attacking his impartiality, his propriety and 
integrity in the exercise of his judicial functions, must be firmly dealt with. This is for 
the reason that such imputations and allegations strike at the very core of the 
functions of a judge. Such accusations are harmful to public interest and are clearly 
calculated to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice and must 
necessarily lower the authority of the courts.26
Michael Hor and Collin Seah have pointed out that if it is significant that the judge is 
a trier of fact, one would expect the threshold for determining if the court has been 
 
org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Complete.pdf> (accessed 2 July 2009, archived at <http://www. 
webcitation.org/5iVtL40fe>) at 25, in 1985 Singapore had a human development index that took 
it into the list of countries regarded as having ‘high human development’. As of 2006 it was 28th 
out of 75 countries on the list. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) regards Singapore as one 
of 33 countries with ‘advanced economies’: IMF, “World Economic Outlook: Database—WEO 
Groups and Aggregates Information” (April 2009) <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/ 
2009/01/weodata/groups.htm> (accessed 2 July 2009, archived at <http://www.webcitation. 
org/5iVtTF1il>). 
21  According to the most recent national census conducted in 2000, 93% of the resident population 
of Singapore aged 15 years and older were literate (defined as the ability to read with 
understanding in specified languages), some 57% of the non-student population aged 15 years and 
older had at least secondary school qualifications, and 12% of the non-student population were 
university graduates: Leow Bee Geok, Census of Population 2000 Statistical Release 2: Education, 
Language and Religion (Singapore: Department of Statistics, Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
2000), <http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/popn/c2000sr2/cop2000sr2.pdf> (accessed 2 July 
2009, archived at <http://www.webcitation.org/5iVtc3t3D>) at 9, paras 1 and 2, and at 10, para 
7. 
22  See Michael Hor & Collin Seah, “Selected Issues in the Freedom of Speech and Expression in 
Singapore” (1991) 12 Sing L Rev 296 at 309–310: “The implication [in McLeod] is clearly that the 
‘coloured populations’ of these colonies are not to be trusted to assess for themselves the accuracy 
of scandalizing speech, unlike the inhabitants of the mother country. This view is perhaps 
excusable, being made almost a century ago with the British Empire at its zenith, by a court of the 
colonial masters. It would be ludicrous and inexcusably insulting if the same view were taken of 
the people of modern Singapore after almost 30 years of independence and long after the 
establishment of a comprehensive education system.” This article was written 18 years ago. See 
also Thio Li-ann, “An ‘i’ for an ‘I’? Singapore’s Communitarian Model of Constitutional 
Adjudication” (1997) 27 HKLJ 152 at 180–181; Thio Li-ann, “Administrative and Constitutional 
Law” (2006) 7 Sing Acad of L Ann Rev 1 at 33, [1.94]. 
23  Wain, above, n 10 at 394, [34]. 
24  Hertzberg, above, n 3 at 1125, [33]; Chee Soon Juan, above, n 2 at 659–660, [26]. 
25  Andrew Phang Boon Leong, “Jury Trial in Singapore and Malaysia: The Unmaking of a Legal 
Institution” (1983) 25 Malaya L Rev 50 at 51. Juries have never been used in civil trials in 
Singapore: id at 50, n 1. 
26  Wain, above, n 10 at 394, [34]. 
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scandalized to be lower in non-jury trials in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom. 
However, this is not the case – the same rules apply to both jury and non-jury 
trials.27 Thio Li-ann suggests the reasoning in Wain may be that since Singapore 
judges have a heavier responsibility as triers of both law and fact, they need greater 
protection from critical speech since such criticism potentially has a more damning 
effect on judicial reputation.28 However, in a non-jury legal system there is arguably 
a greater public interest in ensuring that judges remain accountable to the people. 
Hence, there should be greater freedom to discuss the manner in which judges carry 
out their functions.29
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY 
It is evident that an offence that penalizes persons for speaking their minds 
potentially infringes the right to freedom of speech that is constitutionally protected 
in most democratic jurisdictions. This right is guaranteed by Article 14(1)(a) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, 30  which states that “every citizen of 
Singapore has the right to freedom of speech and expression”.31 However, the right is 
subject to Article 14(2)(a): 
Parliament may by law impose… on the rights conferred by clause (1)(a), such 
restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of 
Singapore or any part thereof, friendly relations with other countries, public order or 
morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to 
provide against contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to any offence… 
[Emphasis added.] 
In Chee Soon Juan, the view was taken that where the High Court and Court 
of Appeal32 were concerned, the restriction imposed by Parliament pursuant to the 
Article took the form of section 7(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act33 which 
provided that these courts had “power to punish for contempt of court”. This was 
statutory recognition of the common law misdemeanour of contempt of court, and 
included the offence of scandalizing the judiciary. Thus, the offence could not be 
regarded as contrary to Article 14(1)(a).34 The constitutionality of the offence was not 
challenged in Hertzberg.35
 
27  Hor & Seah, above, n 22 at 306–307. 
28  Thio, “An ‘i’ for an ‘I’”, above, n 22 at 175. 
29  Thio, ibid. See also Hor & Seah, above, n 22 at 307; Thio, “Administrative and Constitutional Law”, 
above, n 22 at 33, [1.94]. 
30  1999 Reprint. 
31  Note that the right is expressly reserved to Singapore citizens and therefore may not be availed of 
by foreign nationals (see Attorney-General v Wain [1991] SLR 383 at 398, [54]–[55], HC 
(Singapore)), presumably even if they have permanent residency status in Singapore. 
32  The High Court is Singapore’s superior court with unlimited original jurisdiction, while the Court 
of Appeal is its final appellate court. 
33  Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed. 
34  Chee Soon Juan, above, n 2 at 660–661, [29], citing Wain, above, n 31 at 394, [35]. 
35  Hertzberg, above, n 3 at 1119, [21]: “Given the public importance of protecting the administration 
of justice, the law of contempt has been considered, not just in Singapore, but in other 
jurisdictions as well, to be a justifiable restriction on the right to freedom of speech… . The 
Singapore High Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of the law of contempt… on the 
basis that that the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Art 14(1)(a) of the 
Constitution is not absolute and no one is entitled ‘under the guise of freedom of speech and 
expression’ to make irresponsible accusations against the Judiciary so as to undermine public 
confidence in the administration of justice… . Mr Jeyaretnam [the respondent’s solicitor] is also 
not contending to the contrary in the instant case before me.” [Citations omitted.] 
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Article 4 of the Constitution expressly affirms that ordinary legislation must 
be consistent with the constitutional text: 
This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic of Singapore and any law 
enacted by the Legislature after the commencement of this Constitution which is 
inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. 
Counsel for the respondent in Wain did not contend that the offence had been 
abolished by the Constitution,36 and I agree with this. It is difficult to claim that the 
offence serves no purpose whatsoever and must be abrogated in order to vindicate 
the right to free speech. Nonetheless, it may be argued that since section 7(1) of the 
Supreme Court of Judicature Act was enacted to place the common law offence of 
contempt of court on a statutory footing, any such common law principles that are 
inconsistent with Article 14 are void to the extent of the inconsistency. We may 
therefore question whether the ‘inherent tendency’ test is consonant with the 
freedom of speech and expression, and if not, whether an appropriate alternative 
exists. 
Recall, however, the apparent latitude granted by Article 14(2)(a) to the 
legislature: “Parliament may by law impose… restrictions designed to… provide 
against contempt of court”. In Chee Siok Chin v Minister for Home Affairs,37 one of 
the issues facing the court was whether certain provisions of the Miscellaneous 
Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act 38  were consistent with the right to 
freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 14(1)(b) of the Constitution.39 This right 
is subject to Article 14(2)(b), which reads: “Parliament may be law impose… on the 
right conferred by clause (1)(b), such restrictions as it considers necessary or 
expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part thereof or public 
order”. The court compared this provision with Article 19(3) of the Indian 
Constitution: 
Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing 
law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the 
interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable 
restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Noting the absence of the word reasonable in Singapore’s Article 14(2)(b), the judge 
concluded: 
In contrast to the Indian Constitution, there can be no questioning of whether the 
legislation is “reasonable”. The court’s sole task, when a constitutional challenge is 
advanced, is to ascertain whether an impugned law is within the purview of any of the 
permissible restrictions. … All that needs to be established is a nexus between the 
object of the impugned law and one of the permissible subjects stipulated in Art 14(2) 
of the Constitution.40
No stretch of the imagination is required to apply this interpretation to Article 
14(2)(a) which also refers to “restrictions”, rather than the term “reasonable 
restrictions” which appears in Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution. 
 
36  Ibid. 
37  [2006] 1 SLR 582, HC (Singapore). 
38  Cap 184, 1997 Rev Ed (Singapore). 
39  The Constitution, Art 14(1)(b), states: “[A]ll citizens of Singapore have the right to assemble 
peaceably and without arms”. 
40  Chee Siok Chin, above, n 37 at 601, [45]–[46]. 
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Is there sufficient reason for holding that the presence of the word reasonable 
in the Indian Constitution and its absence in corresponding provisions of the 
Singapore Constitution indicates that Singapore courts are not to have regard to the 
reasonableness of legislation as against constitutional rights? Singapore gained a bill 
of rights for the first time when it became one of the states of the Federation of 
Malaysia in 1963, and the Federal Constitution of Malaysia was extended to it. 
Following Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore made the bill of 
rights in the Federal Constitution applicable to its new Constitution.41 Malaysia itself 
had received the fundamental liberties in a new constitution upon its independence 
from Great Britain in 1957. In February that year, a draft constitution with copious 
borrowings from the Indian Constitution 42  had been drawn up and submitted 
together with a report to Her Britannic Majesty and their Highnesses the Rulers of 
the Malay States by a Constitutional Commission under the chairmanship of Lord 
Reid, a member of Judicial Committee of the House of Lords.43 Article 10(1) of the 
draft constitution stated: 
Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, subject to any 
reasonable restriction imposed by federal law in the interest of the security of the 
Federation, public order, or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation, 
or incitement to any offence. [Emphasis added.] 
On the other hand, in the finalized draft which was eventually enacted into law 
the word reasonable had been dropped.44 It is not clear why this was done. Debates 
in the Federation legislature shed little light on the intended meaning or scope of 
provisions of the bill of rights: 
As contemporary evidence of the meanings of controversial provisions the debates on 
the Constitution in the Legislative Council [of the Federation of Malaya] are not too 
helpful… No real discussion was had of its provisions. The Chief Minister restated 
some of them; but members were generally keenly conscious of the fact that they were 
expected to act favourably and quickly on the Constitution as a whole. Indeed, any 
desire to delay impending Merdeka45 by constitutional controversy was pointedly 
eschewed by more than one speaker, most of whom rose simply to defend, or 
occasionally attack, not to debate or expound or clarify any section of, the 
Constitution. Many took the floor for the sole purpose of congratulating the Chief 
Minister.46
 
41  Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965 (No 9 of 1965, 1985 Rev Ed), s 6(1): “The provisions 
of the Constitution of Malaysia, other than those set out in subsection (3), shall continue in force 
in Singapore subject to such modifications, adaptations and qualifications and exceptions as may 
be necessary to bring them into conformity with the independent status of Singapore upon 
separation from Malaysia.” 
42  R[eginald] H[ugh] Hickling, Malaysian Public Law (Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia: Pelanduk 
Publications, 1997) at 15. 
43  Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission (Chairman: Lord Reid) (London: 
HMSO, 1957), App II. The report, but not its appendices, is reproduced as App A of Kevin Y[ew] 
L[ee] Tan & Thio Li-ann, Tan, Yeo & Lee’s Constitutional Law in Malaysia and Singapore (2nd 
ed) (Singapore: Butterworths Asia, 1997). 
44  See the Proposed Constitution of Federation of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Printed at the 
Government Press by G A Smith, Government Printer, 1957) at 4. 
45  Merdeka is a Malay word meaning ‘independence’. Used in this context, it refers to the 
independence of the Federation of Malaya – now the Federation of Malaysia – from the United 
Kingdom on 31 August 1957, now celebrated as Merdeka Day. 
46  Harry E Groves, “Fundamental Liberties in the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya – A 
Comparative Study” (1959) 5 Howard LJ 190 at 214. 
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Following Singapore’s own independence from Malaysia in 1965, a constitutional 
commission chaired by the then Chief Justice Wee Chong Jin was appointed to 
formulate constitutional safeguards for multiracialism and equality of all citizens.47 
The commission, which presented its report in August 1966, generally approved the 
fundamental liberties imported from the Malaysian Constitution without detailed 
discussion of them. The Singapore Government made known its views on the report 
in Parliament on 21 December 1966 and legislative debates were held in March 1967. 
Neither the Wee Commission report nor the subsequent Parliamentary debates on it 
provide assistance as to how Article 14(2)(a) of the Singapore Constitution should be 
interpreted. 
In the circumstances, it is submitted there is a distinct lack of evidence as to 
why the word reasonable was omitted from the Malaysian predecessor of Article 
14(2)(a). Since the fundamental liberties in a constitution should be interpreted 
generously48 and not in a manner that curtails rights unless the legislature has 
unambiguously expressed its intention to do so,49 it cannot conclusively be said that 
Parliament did not intend to confer on the courts the discretion to consider the 
rationality of statutory restrictions on free speech, even if they fall within the 
exceptions set out in Article 14(2)(a). Another way of interpreting the Article, which 
is more consonant with the right to freedom of speech, is that the Constitution’s 
framers found it unnecessary to state that limitations imposed on the right had to be 
reasonable since it is inherent in rights interpretation that the judiciary must assess 
the reasonableness of such limitations.50
Indeed, Singapore courts have on occasion asserted this duty. In Jeyaretnam 
v Public Prosecutor,51 for instance, Chan Sek Keong J (who has subsequently become 
Chief Justice of Singapore) held that if a statute vested absolute and untrammelled 
discretion in a public official to deny a citizen a licence to hold a public event, this 
would be an unconstitutional deprivation of the citizen’s right to freedom of speech 
and expression.52 Furthermore, in Wain Sinnathuray J said: “I recognize that this 
court has duty to uphold the right to freedom of speech and expression, and I accept 
that this right must be balanced against the needs of the administration of justice, 
one of which is to protect the integrity of the courts.”53 He went on to find that the 
‘inherent tendency’ test achieved an appropriate balance. 
Contrary to the view expressed in Wain, it is submitted this test does not give 
adequate recognition to the right to free speech. A widely accepted method for 
weighing governmental interests against rights is the proportionality analysis 
 
47  Report of the Constitutional Commission, 1966 (Chairman: Wee Chong Jin CJ) ([Singapore: 
Printed by the Government Printer], 1966) at 1, para 1. The report is reproduced as App D of Tan 
& Thio, above, n 43. 
48  Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1981] AC 648 at 670, [1980–1981] SLR 48 at 61, [23], PC (on 
appeal from Singapore), citing Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher, [1980] AC 319 at 328, PC (on 
appeal from Bermuda). 
49  See, for instance, Morguard Properties Ltd v City of Winnipeg (1983) 3 DLR (4th) 1 at 13, SC 
(Can); Wheeler v Leicester City Council [1985] AC 1054 at 1065, HL; and Coco v The Queen 
(1994) 179 CLR 427 at 437, HC (Aust). 
50  See Hor & Seah, above, n 22 at 298; Michael Hor, Case Note, “The Freedom of Speech and 
Defamation: Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew” [1992] Sing J Legal Studies 542 at 
544–549, particularly 547. 
51  [1989] SLR 978, HC (Singapore). 
52  Id at 987, [27]. 
53  Wain, above, n 10 at 397, [52]. 
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undertaken in de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries, Lands and Housing.54 Lord Steyn said that the court must ask itself 
whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are 
rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are 
no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.55
The offence of scandalizing the court satisfies the first limb of the analysis since its 
objective of protecting the administration of justice is certainly of high importance. 
On the other hand, the ‘inherent tendency’ test may lack a rational connection to this 
objective, and may infringe free speech more than is necessary to accomplish the 
objective. 
First, it is questionable whether the offence in its present incarnation is truly 
effective in upholding public confidence in the administration of justice. When the 
‘inherent tendency’ test is applied, it does not matter whether there is any truth or 
not in the utterance by the alleged contemnor.56 A court may convict so long as it 
takes the view that the utterance poses some hazard, even if slight, to the 
administration of justice. This approach seems apt to create the impression that the 
court is more concerned with suppressing criticism to avoid trouble than 
investigating if the criticism is justified. Moreover, by finding too easily that an 
utterance amounts to contempt, the court may inadvertently give it undeserved 
credence.57
Secondly, it may be contended that the ‘inherent tendency’ test does not 
satisfy the last limb of the proportionality analysis. The judge in Hertzberg gave two 
reasons for preferring this test: it does not require detailed proof of what will often be 
unprovable – that public confidence in the administration of justice really was 
impaired by the relevant publication; and it enables the court to intervene before any 
impairment of public confidence in the administration of justice actually occurs.58 
These reasons, which were mentioned in a 1987 report on contempt of court by the 
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), 59  are problematic. Tests that are 
stricter than the ‘inherent tendency’ test, such as the ‘real risk’ test, do not require 
proof that public confidence in the administration of justice has actually been 
impaired, only that there exists a genuine and substantial risk that it may be affected. 
Similarly, since the offence is established by showing the existence of risk and not its 
eventuation, the court is not required to wait till public confidence in the 
administration of justice has already been impaired. 
 
54  [1999] 1 AC 69, PC (on appeal from Antigua and Barbuda). See also R (Pretty) v Director of Public 
Prosecutions [2002] 1 AC 800 at 844, [93], HL; R (Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2002] QB 1391 at 1416, [64], CA; and International Transport Roth GmbH v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] QB 728 at 753, [51], and 789, [181], CA (Civil 
Div). Compare R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103, SC (Can); R v Kopyto (1987) 47 DLR (4th) 213 at 
238–239 and 252, CA (Ont); RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199 at [160], SC (Can); 
Libman v Quebec (Attorney General) [1997] 3 SCR 659, at [58], SC (Can). 
55  De Freitas, id at 80. 
56  Unlike the law of defamation, justification is currently not a defence to the offence of scandalizing 
the court in Singapore: Hertzberg, above, n 3 at 1121, [23], citing Chee Soon Juan, above, n 2 at 
665, [47]. This issue is explored below in Pt II of the article. 
57  Hor & Seah, above, n 22 at 310. 
58  Hertzberg, above, n 3 at 1125, [33]. 
59  The Australian Law Reform Commission’s report Contempt (Report No 35) (Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1987) at 247–248, [427], cited in Hertzberg, ibid. 
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The ALRC also pointed out counterarguments to the above reasons, notably 
that the ‘inherent tendency’ test “inhibits freedom of expression… to an unjustifiable 
degree, because criminal liability is imposed without it being necessary to establish 
that the community, or any institution or person within it, has been harmed or put in 
jeopardy in any significant way”.60 In addition, since the ‘inherent tendency’ test 
opens the door to courts clamping down on conduct or speech that may not be 
significantly harmful, this infringes the principle that prior restraints on publication 
are only justifiable on the most compelling grounds.61 The law frowns upon prior 
restraints as they have an inhibiting or ‘chilling’ effect on speech, causing people to 
censor themselves which leads to potentially valid criticism not being articulated. 
III. ‘REAL RISK’ OR ‘CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER’? 
If the ‘inherent tendency’ test is inconsistent with the right to freedom of speech and 
expression, what alternatives are there? We have already encountered the ‘real risk’ 
test, which requires a genuine and significant risk – certainly much more than a 
“remote possibility”62 – that the administration of justice will be adversely affected. 
In the United States the offence of scandalizing the court is unknown,63 but in 
Bridges v California,64 which involved a contempt of court action for comments 
relating to pending litigation, the Supreme Court adopted an even higher standard – 
the ‘clear and present danger’ test, which requires that “the substantive evil must be 
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can 
be punished”.65 This test was applied to the offence of scandalizing the court by two 
of the three majority judges of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Kopyto.66
In Bridges, the ‘clear and present danger’ standard was justified on the basis 
of the history of the United States Bill of Rights: “No purpose in ratifying the Bill of 
Rights was clearer than that of securing for the people of the United States much 
greater freedom of religion, expression, assembly, and petition than the people of 
Great Britain had ever enjoyed. … [T]he only conclusion supported by history is that 
the unqualified prohibitions laid down by the framers were intended to give to liberty 
of the press, as to the other liberties, the broadest scope that could be countenanced 
in an orderly society.”67 North of the border, Cory JA accorded the right to freedom 
of expression in section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter68 the exalted status given to it 
 
60  ALRC, Contempt, id at 248, [428]. 
61  Id at 248, [429], citing Waterhouse v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1986) 68 ALR 75, 
HC (Aust). 
62  Times Newspapers, above, n 7 at 298–299, citing R v Duffy, ex parte Nash [1960] 2 QB 188 at 
200; Hertzberg, above, n 3 at 1125, [33]. See also Mamabolo, above, n 13 at 68, [45]. 
63  Bridges v California 314 US 252 at 287 (1941) per Frankfurter J (dissenting in part), Stone CJ and 
Roberts and Byrnes JJ concurring: “Some English judges extended their authority for checking 
interferences with judicial business actually in hand, to ‘lay by the heel’ those responsible for 
‘scandalizing the court’, that is, bringing it into general disrepute. Such foolishness has long since 
been disavowed in England and has never found lodgment here.” 
64  Bridges, ibid. 
65  Id at 263 per Black J for the majority. See also Pennekamp v Florida 328 US 331 (1946) at 1031, 
SC (US); Craig v Harney 331 US 367 at 376 (1947), SC (US); Wood v Georgia 370 US 375 (1962), 
SC (US); H[arry] E Groves, “Scandalizing the Court – A Comparative Study” (1963) 5 Malaya L 
Rev 58. 
66  Kopyto, above, n 54, per Goodman and Cory JJA. 
67  Bridges, above, n 63 at 265. 
68  The Canadian Charter, s 2(b), reads: “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: … (b) 
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other 
media of communication…” 
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in the United States. The Charter was intended to effect a decisive break with the 
past.69 Hence, despite the right being expressly subject to “such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society”,70 the judge commented that “it is difficult to imagine a more important 
guarantee of freedom to a democratic society than that of freedom of expression”; 
therefore, it should be restricted “only in the clearest of circumstances”.71  
As with Canada, the introduction of a bill of rights into Singapore was 
intended to establish a new legal order. Under the common law, the rights enjoyed by 
the people were the residual liberties remaining after their freedom of action had 
been restricted by statutes. The bill of rights that came into force tasked the judiciary 
with the responsibility of determining if statutory provisions are consistent with 
fundamental liberties, and striking down those that are not. However, unlike Canada, 
Singapore courts have not endorsed the view that free speech should be accorded 
pre-eminence among the fundamental liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Rather, they have emphasized the continuity of the ordinary law before and after the 
Constitution’s commencement. In two defamation cases involving the opposition 
politician J B Jeyaretnam and the then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew,72 the Court of 
Appeal noted that the legislature had applied the Defamation Ordinance 195773 of 
Malaysia to Singapore while it was part of the Federation, in the face of the right to 
freedom of speech and expression in the Federal Constitution. The Ordinance was 
premised on the continuing existence of the common law of defamation. On 
Singapore’s independence from Malaysia, the Republic of Singapore Independence 
Act 196574 provided for the continued application in Singapore of both the law of 
defamation and the right to free speech. Thus, the Court took the position that it was 
implicit that the right of free speech is subject to the common law of defamation as 
modified by the Defamation Ordinance.75 With respect, this is an unsatisfactory 
conclusion. A court must exercise discretion to determine if common law and 
statutory principles are consonant with constitutional rights, instead of assuming 
that they are.76
Nonetheless, it may reasonably be argued that the balance struck by the 
Singapore Constitution between rights and other interests sought to be protected by 
the government is not the same as that in Canada and the United States.77 Like the 
Canadian Charter, the Singapore Constitution explicitly permits legislative 
limitations on the right to freedom of speech and expression, in particular to provide 
against contempt of court. This suggests that the right is not intended to be 
 
69  See, for instance, R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 321 at 359, SC (Can), cited in 
Kopyto, above, n 54 at 224. 
70  Canadian Charter, s 1. 
71  Kopyto, above, n 54 at 226–227. 
72  Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew [1990] SLR 38, and Jeyaretnam Joshua 
Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 2 SLR 310. Lee Kuan Yew stepped down as Prime Minister in 
1990, but remains a Member of the Singapore Parliament. He assumed the designation of 
Minister Mentor in 2004. 
73  No 20 of 1957 (Malaysia). 
74  Above, n 41. 
75  Jeyaretnam, above, n 72, [1992] 2 SLR at 331, [58]. The Defamation Ordinance is now the 
Defamation Act (Cap 75, 1985 Rev Ed) (Singapore). 
76  The Court also held that the law of defamation is not inconsistent with the right of free speech 
under Art 14(1)(a) and, accordingly, no modification, adaptation or qualification of, or exception 
to, the law was necessary under Art 162 of the Constitution: id at 331, [57]. For criticism of this 
view, see Hor, “The Freedom of Speech and Defamation”, above, n 50. 
77  Compare Radio Avon, above, n 7 at 234; Mamabolo, above, n 13 at [40]–[41]. 
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paramount over other interests, especially as it remains to be seen whether the 
judiciary’s opinion of the importance of free speech will evolve and align itself with 
the attitude of the North American courts. When that happens, it will be appropriate 
to prefer the ‘clear and present danger’ test to the ‘real risk’ test. In the meantime, for 
the reasons already mentioned, I contend that Article 14(1)(a) of the Singapore 
Constitution requires the rejection of the present ‘inherent tendency’ test in favour of 
at least the ‘real risk’ standard. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although the text of Article 14(2)(a) of the Singapore Constitution appears to confer 
on the legislature a wide discretion to enact legislation abridging the right to freedom 
of speech and expression to provide against contempt of court, it is inherent in the 
nature of bills of rights that courts have a duty to balance the right against the 
government’s interest in protecting the administration of justice. It is submitted that 
nothing in the history of the Constitution’s framing prevents courts from taking such 
a view. In carrying out its responsibility, the court should apply a proportionality 
analysis and ensure, among other things, that there is a rational link between the law 
supported by the government and the legislative objective sought to be achieved, and 
that the law does not impair the right more than is necessary to accomplish the 
objective. For the reasons given above, the current ‘inherent tendency’ test applicable 
to the offence of scandalizing the court does not satisfy the second and third limbs of 
the proportionality analysis, and is therefore unconstitutional. 
Hertzberg and other recent cases demonstrate that the Singapore courts hold 
a very traditional conception of the offence of scandalizing the court. This conception 
gives high priority to the protection of the administration of justice over the freedom 
of speech and expression in the Singapore Constitution. Thus, words and conduct 
that merely have an inherent tendency to affect the administration of justice are 
actionable, even if there is no real likelihood that this will happen. If the right to free 
speech is to have substantive meaning rather than be a meaningless mantra, the 
‘inherent tendency’ test should be replaced by at least a ‘real risk’ test. The right seeks 
to vindicate certain key interests, such as ensuring that democracy thrives and 
mistakes are exposed and remedied. These interests are better served by a more 
stringent standard which counsels judges to punish only for statements creating a 
genuine and substantial risk of damage to the administration of justice. 
